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United Auto Workers (UAW) strike of 1945-46
From November 21, 1945 until March 13, 1946 (113 days), CIO’s United Automobile Workers (UAW), organized “320,000 hourly workers” to form a nationwide strike against the General Motors Corporation.〔John Barnard. “American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers During the Reuther Years, 1935-1970”. Wayne State University Press, 2004, p. 212.〕 It was “the longest strike against a major manufacturer” that the UAW had yet seen, and it was also “the longest national GM strike in its history."〔 As director of the UAW’s General Motors Department (coordinator of union relations with GM),〔Kevin Boyle. “The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism 1945-1968”. Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 21-22.〕 Walter Reuther suggested to his colleagues the idea of striking the GM manufacturing plants with a ‘one-at-a-time’ strategy, which was “intended to maximize pressure on the target company.”〔 Reuther also put forth the demands of the strikers: a 30 percent increase in wages and a hold on product prices. However, the strike ended to the dissatisfaction of Walter Reuther and the UAW, and the workers received only a 17.5-percent increase in wages.
== Walter Reuther leads the way ==
The story of the UAW-CIO strike against GM in 1945-46 is very much a story of Walter Reuther. Reuther argued, on behalf of the UAW, that the ‘inordinate productivity’ of modern technology put the power of creating ‘permanent prosperity’ into the hands of the Americans.〔Kevin Boyle. “The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism 1945-1968”. Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 24.〕 But instead, Reuther claimed that the controllers of that technology in the auto industry used the power to “maximize profits by pursuing a program of ‘planned scarcity’” (therefore driving up product prices) while cutting jobs.〔 The corrupt system caused a cycle of problems, and the limited work hours meant that Americans could not even purchase the limited goods produced.〔 This, in effect, meant that “social needs went unmet: forced to compete for high-priced materials, municipalities could not afford to build new schools and hospitals, states could not afford to build roads and bridges, and workers could not afford to build homes."〔 Walter Reuther’s statement in 1944 explained his central thesis; He said, “‘It is my determined belief that there can be no permanent prosperity.. so long as the controls of production remain in the hands of a privileged minority.'"〔
Reuther followed Thorestein Veblen’s take on corporate enterprise. For the auto industry, the idea was that corporations would use new technologies to speed up production and were therefore able to cut jobs,〔 and of course, as unemployment goes up, wages go down because work is more scarce and people are willing to work for whatever they can find. Not to mention, the technology had broken the automobile industry down into repetitive processes that required little-to-no skill and no educational credentials. This gave the corporate elites great power over price controls, wage settings, and overall decision makings. Reuther was taking a stand against the powerful corporate enterprise and advocating the “democratization of industry,” which was exactly his view of what should be implemented, and it showed through his demands in the UAW-GM bargain.〔Kevin Boyle. “The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism 1945-1968”. Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 22.〕
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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